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Introduction 
The time has come for regulators to settle upon a system of over-
sight for Bitcoin.1 When the fledgling online payment network debuted 
 
1. Throughout this Note, I will use “Bitcoin,” with a capital “B,” as a proper 
noun to refer to the network of computers, users and software that allows 
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in 2009, a single bitcoin was worth about a half a cent.2 Since then, the 
value of bitcoins has skyrocketed, resting around $400 as of December 
2015,3 but reaching as high as $1,200 in the fall of 2013.4 As the value 
of individual bitcoins has increased, so has public interest in the new 
technology.5 Over 1.4 million people in the United States, and over 5.5 
million in the world, have downloaded the Bitcoin software,6 and 
millions of dollars’ worth of bitcoins are exchanged every day.7 This 
growing interest has led investors to develop improved infrastructure 
and to offer ancillary services, in order to ease the public’s use of Bitcoin 
and to encourage the continued growth of the Bitcoin economy.8 
Whether you believe that Bitcoin is the payment system of the 
future or an outright scam, it is undeniable that Bitcoin continues to 
gain traction and prominence in the global economy.9 Bitcoin simplifies 
 
the Bitcoin economy to function. Conversely, I will use “bitcoin,” with a 
lowercase “b,” to refer to the individual files that are the unit of measure 
in the Bitcoin economy and are exchanged across the Bitcoin network. 
2. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 
Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 159, 164 (2012). 
3. Bitcoin Price Index, CoinDesk, http://www.coindesk.com/price/ [https:// 
perma.cc/L3JD-X4NU] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
4. Maureen Farrell, Bitcoin Now Tops $1,200, MoneyBeat (Nov. 29, 2013, 
12:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/11/29/bitcoin-now-tops- 
1200/ [https://perma.cc/MSN9-NBUQ]. 
5. See Mala Mukunda, Bitcoin Price Rise in Line with Adoption, Investment, 
Interest, IHB (June 5, 2014), https://ihb.io/2014-06-05/news/bitcoin-price-
rise-line-adoption-investment-interest-7055 [https://perma.cc/3GJP-G4BR].  
6. Download Statistics: All Files, SourceForge, http://sourceforge.net/ 
projects/bitcoin/files/stats/map?dates=2009-01-01+to+2015-03-10 
[https://perma.cc/4DRP-4V79] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015) (reflecting data 
as of Mar. 10, 2015). 
7. BitStamp (USD), bitcoin charts, https://bitcoincharts.com/markets/ 
bitstampUSD_trades.html [https://perma.cc/J5TA-4XW6] (last visited Dec. 
21, 2015). 
8. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, First U.S.-Based Bitcoin Exchange Opens, 
CNNMoney (Jan. 26, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/ 
26/investing/bitcoin-exchange-coinbase/ [https://perma.cc/7TB7-W7V8] 
(noting that investors have contributed $106 million to operate a Bitcoin 
exchange in the United States); see also Caleb Chen, Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust 
ETF Files for 1M Shares on NASDAQ; More to be Revealed in January, 
Cryptocoinsnews (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/ 
winklevoss-bitcoin-trust-etf-files-for-shares-nasdaq-more-to-be-revealed-
in-january/ [https://perma.cc/X2PV-XPBQ] (discussing plans for a Bitcoin 
ETF, which would allow any investor to invest in Bitcoin via the NASDAQ 
stock exchange). 
9. See Alanna Petroff, Bitcoin Reshaping Future of Money, CNNMoney (Dec. 
10, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/10/technology/bitcoin-
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online purchases and lowers the transaction costs of making online 
payments,10 replicating for users the ease and security of in-person, cash 
purchases.11 Due to Bitcoin’s complex and still young technology, how-
ever, regulators have been hesitant to issue guidance and provide over-
sight to the nascent Bitcoin economy.12 This lack of regulation has led 
many to rob and abuse the Bitcoin system, costing consumers millions 
of dollars.13 
As it becomes easier for ordinary people to invest in, and use, 
Bitcoin, the United States needs to develop a regulatory framework to 
manage Bitcoin. But, before a robust regulatory system can be devel-
oped to protect consumers, regulators need to settle upon what, exactly, 
Bitcoin is. Until Bitcoin is definitively categorized, regulatory efforts 
will be inconsistent, inefficient, and, likely, contradictory. 
In this Note, I will argue that Bitcoin should be categorized and 
regulated as a commodity. This treatment would be consistent with the 
economic behavior of Bitcoin’s users and would provide a clearer 
regulatory path for Bitcoin’s future. Additionally, categorizing Bitcoin 
as a commodity would provide increased clarity to existing regulatory 
efforts. Part I of this Note will briefly discuss the basic technological 
underpinnings of the Bitcoin system. Part II will quickly survey the 
current regulatory landscape around Bitcoin. Part III will examine 
Bitcoin’s identity crisis and explain why Bitcoin should not be categor-
ized as a currency or a security—the two other categories vying for 
Bitcoin’s inclusion. Part IV will explain why Bitcoin is a commodity,  
currency-fred-wilson/ [https://perma.cc/PD8M-XV7G] (“Love it or hate 
it, Bitcoin is here to stay.”). 
10. See Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a 
Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 
2013 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 165, 182 (2013). 
11. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Comment, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private 
Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 Loy. Consumer 
L. Rev. 111, 116 (2012). 
12. See Stan Higgins, Congressman Stockman: It’s Too Early to Regulate Bitcoin, 
CoinDesk (Dec. 5, 2014, 11:05 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/congressman-
stockman-too-early-bitcoin-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/E3EE-AXUW] 
(discussing a proposed bill that would prevent any Bitcoin regulation for five 
years because the technology is “still in its early stages”). 
13. E.g., Alistair Charlton, Bitcoin Traders Robbed as Mt. Gox Exchange 
Attacks Continue, Int’l Bus. Times (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:46 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-exchange-ddos-attacks-continue-traders- 
robbed-456466 [https://perma.cc/9JY7-MHF6] (discussing a phishing scheme 
at a bitcoin exchange); see also Tim Hornyak, One Year Later, We’re No 
Closer to Finding MtGox’s Missing Millions Worth of Bitcoins, PCWorld 
(Mar. 4, 2015, 6:38 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2892892/ 
one-year-later-were-no-closer-to-finding-mtgoxs-missing-millions.html 
[https://perma.cc/4YVD-9WAV] (noting that, at current Bitcoin prices, 
the stolen bitcoins are worth about $180 million). 
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and Part V will examine the legal advantages of treating Bitcoin as a 
commodity. Finally, Part VI will examine how treating Bitcoin as a 
commodity can provide needed consumer protection regulation in the 
Bitcoin economy. 
I. Bitcoin’s Basics 
A.  Bitcoin’s Goal and Purpose 
In 2009, a computer programmer, working under the name Satoshi 
Nakamoto, released a paper called “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic 
Cash System,” giving birth to the Bitcoin network.14 The goal of Bitcoin 
was to provide a network where “pseudonymous entities” could transfer 
value online, using a decentralized medium, free from government 
interference.15 The central advantage that Bitcoin sought to provide 
users was the ability for “‘two willing parties to transact directly with 
each other without the need for a trusted third-party’ or intermediary 
(or central issuer or payment system), where the basis of the 
transaction’s security is ‘cryptographic proof instead of trust.’”16 
Bitcoin achieved its goal through the creation of a computer net-
work that verifies exchanges as they happen. Every time a transaction 
occurs, the system reports the transaction to all other computers in the 
network. Because all transactions are reported to the network, a trans-
feror cannot fake a transaction by not actually sending anything to the 
transferee.17 A Bitcoin transaction can only be successfully completed if 
the rest of the computers in the network verify that the transaction 
actually happened.18 Prior to Bitcoin, secure online transactions could 
only be conducted with the help of a third party, like a bank or PayPal, 
ensuring that funds were transferred when they were claimed to be, and 
that no one was cheating the system.19 The need for an intermediary to 
provide security for transactions increased the transactions’ costs.20 In 
 
14. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 115. 
15. Id. 
16. David Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and 
the Madness of Crowdfunding Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 Wm. & 
Mary Bus. L. Rev. 489, 512–13 (2014) (quoting Ian Steadman, Wary of 
Bitcoin? A Guide to Some Other Cryptocurrencies, Ars Technica (May 11, 
2013, 9:51 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/05/wary-of-bitcoin-a-
guide-to-some-other-cryptocurrencies/ [https://perma.cc/587D-BC5X]). 
17. See Dion, supra note 10, at 167–68 (discussing Bitcoin’s security mechanisms). 
18. See id. at 167 (explaining how Bitcoin users validate transactions). 
19. See id. (“Bitcoin was designed to reduce the transaction costs that are 
created when third parties validate transactions and mediate disputes.”). 
20. Id. 
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the Bitcoin network, these kinds of intermediaries are no longer necess-
ary, allowing transactions to be conducted more efficiently.21 
Additionally, the Bitcoin system was designed to operate as a 
medium of exchange that existed without the interference of any cen-
tralized government or authority.22 Instead of a medium of exchange 
backed by precious metal or government fiat, Bitcoin is not backed by 
anything and instead relies on the strength of its algorithms and the 
large computer network supporting its system to give it value.23 This 
algorithm controls the supply of Bitcoin, causing bitcoins to be created 
and introduced into the market at an exponentially decreasing rate.24 
Bitcoin’s software ensures that “there will never be more than 21 million 
bitcoins in circulation, which should occur around 2025.”25 This feature 
is attractive to some Bitcoin users because it removes the possibility of 
a central authority meddling with the monetary supply, in much the 
same way as a gold-backed currency functions.26 
Today, Bitcoin users can spend their bitcoins on an ever-increasing 
array of goods and services.27 Many retailers have begun accepting 
bitcoins for online purchases, including Dell, Overstock.com, and Micro-
soft.28 Also, brick-and-mortar stores are beginning to accept bitcoins.29 
For instance, in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, several restaurants and retail 
stores, dubbed “Bitcoin Boulevard US,” have begun accepting payment 
in bitcoins.30 
 
21. Id. at 182. 
22. Id. at 167. 
23. See Nicholas A. Plassaras, Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: 
Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach of the IMF, 14 Chi. J. Int’l L. 377, 
383, 389–90 (2013) (contrasting Bitcoin and government backed currency). 
24. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 120–21. 
25. Id. at 121 (citation omitted). 
26. Grinberg, supra note 2, at 172. 
27. See Who is Accepting Bitcoin?, CoinReport, https://coinreport.net/coin-
101/accepting-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/J6E9-GERX] (last visited Dec. 26, 
2015) (providing examples of where bitcoins can be used around the world). 
28. What Can You Buy with Bitcoin?, CoinDesk, http://www.coindesk.com/ 
information/what-can-you-buy-with-bitcoins/ [https://perma.cc/ZQV9-
LYRU] (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
29. See Sara Ashley O’Brien, Retailers See Big Upside by Accepting Bitcoins, N.Y. 
Post (Dec. 28, 2013, 9:10 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/12/28/nyc-retailers- 
see-big-upside-by-accepting-bitcoins/ [https://perma.cc/V4QL-XNCA]. 
30. Chuck Soder, Bitcoin Boulevard US: Merchants on Lee Road in Cleveland 
Heights expand acceptance of digital currency, Crain’s Clev. Bus. (Apr. 
23, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20140418/ 
FREE/140419820/bitcoin-boulevard-us-merchants-on-lee-road-in-cleveland-
heights [https://perma.cc/W4D6-J2G9]. 
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Finally, Bitcoin offers its users the prospect of conducting online 
transactions in an anonymous manner.31 Because the system verifies its 
own transactions, and third parties are not necessary to confirm the 
identities of individuals, neither transacting party need know the 
identity of the other to trust that the transaction will take place. This 
anonymity is designed to mirror the level of anonymity found in cash 
transactions.32 Bitcoin critics worry, however, that this feature may ease 
the transaction of illegal activity.33 
B. Bitcoin Transactions 
Bitcoins themselves are nothing more than computer files, like a 
word document or an .mp3; they “can be destroyed or lost just like 
cash.”34 In order to send a bitcoin from one party to another, the 
transferor simply designates the address of the recipient, and sends the 
bitcoin across the Bitcoin network, similar to sending an email.35 To 
secure these transactions, the Bitcoin network employs “public key 
encryption.”36 Each Bitcoin user has two mathematically related keys 
associated with himself or herself: a public key and a private key.37 The 
public key identifies the user on the network, and is visible to all other 
network members; it acts as the address for files to be sent to.38 The 
private key is known only to the user and acts as the “password” to 
authorize the sending of bitcoins to other public key addresses.39 
When a bitcoin is sent from one user to another, the bitcoin file is 
given a unique serial number.40 The new serial number is generated 
 
31. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 115. 
32. See Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating 
Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future 
Directions, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 813, 816 (2014) (“In particular, 
[cryptocurrencies] offer . . . the ability to cloak transactions with a level of 
anonymity that is currently found only with certain cash transactions.”). 
33. E.g., Dion, supra note 10, at 169 (“Bitcoin is ideal for those who seek to 
purchase illegal guns or drugs online, sponsor domestic or international terrorist 
agendas, or even hire a hit man in anonymity.”); see also Omri Marian, A 
Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. Dialogue 53, 59–64 (arguing that for a cryptocurrency to be viable, a 
system needs to be developed to disincentivize anonymous illegal activity). 
34. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 116. 
35. Plassaras, supra note 23, at 384. 
36. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 117. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Nicholas Godlove, Regulatory Overview of Virtual Currency, 10 Okla. 
J.L. & Tech. 71, *9 (2014). 
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through a cryptographic process that combines the bitcoin’s old serial 
number with the transferee’s public key.41 The new serial number is 
broadcast to all the other computers running the Bitcoin program, and 
those computers work to decode the new serial number against the 
public key that the bitcoin was transferred to.42 This decoding process 
verifies the transaction and ensures that it actually took place, securing 
the transaction and system.43 
Each time a transaction takes place, and the Bitcoin network succ-
essfully verifies a transaction, the transaction is logged into the Bitcoin 
“block-chain.”44 Each bitcoin has a block-chain associated with it, act-
ing as a timestamp for each time it was transferred, and, since the 
entries are partially based on each transferee’s public key, a record of 
who the transferee was each time the bitcoin was sent.45 In order for a 
bitcoin to be transferred again, its block-chain must meet the standards 
of the network.46 The chief purpose of the block-chain is to ensure that 
bitcoins cannot be “double-spent” or counterfeited.47 
The block-chain allows the Bitcoin network to operate anony-
mously because the only identifier of each Bitcoin user is their public 
key.48 So, while it is possible to track all of the transactions that a single 
user enacted, the user’s identity is never disclosed.49 Some have argued, 
however, that with advances in network mapping technology, the ident-
ities of users on the network could be extrapolated, if the identity of 
one or two other public keys on the network became known.50 
C. Bitcoin Generation and Acquisition 
Bitcoins are acquired in two primary ways: mining and exchanges. 
Mining is the process that rewards Bitcoin users for running the Bitcoin 
software and keeping their computers in the Bitcoin network.51 Verify-
ing a Bitcoin transaction involves solving a very difficult algorithm 
 
41. Id. 
42. See id. at *22–23 (describing how third parties verify bitcoin transactions). 
43. See id. at *22. 
44. Dion, supra note 10, at 168. 
45. Id. 
46. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 118. 
47. Dion, supra note 10, at 168. 
48. Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the 
Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 85, 91 (2014). 
49. Id. 
50. See Godlove, supra note 40, at *11 (noting that law enforcement could 
work to “de-anonymize” bitcoin transaction through the block-chain). 
51. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 119. 
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problem, and all computers on the network race to verify the transact-
ion first.52 The computer that decodes the algorithm problem first is 
rewarded with bitcoins.53 The Bitcoin network operates because indivi-
dual users “donate” their computing power to verify transactions and 
build block-chains.54 “Essentially, the value to the person who obtains 
bitcoins through mining is the value of his or her hardware needed to 
conduct the mining process plus the amount of time and energy 
spent.”55 However, due to Bitcoin’s built-in limitation on the number of 
bitcoins in the system, the number of bitcoins that a computer receives 
as a reward decreases over time.56 
The second way that a person could acquire bitcoins is through an 
exchange. Exchanges operate as online forums, where people sell their 
bitcoins, at a floating rate, for currency, and vice-versa.57 Alternatively, 
some Bitcoin transactions happen in person, generally arranged through 
online message boards, where cash is exchanged in-person, and bitcoins 
are transferred after the fact.58 
II. Bitcoin’s Current State of Regulation 
While no comprehensive Bitcoin regulatory system presently exists 
in the U.S., several agencies have declared how they will treat Bitcoin. 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the IRS, and a 
federal district court have each attempted to categorize Bitcoin. None 
of these categorization efforts, however, have been consistent, doing 
little to settle the question of what Bitcoin is.59 
A. FinCEN’s Treatment of Bitcoin 
In March 2013, FinCEN issued guidance “to clarify the applicability 
of the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to persons 
 
52. Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin A Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 
J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 99, 102 (2013). 
53. Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 120. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 119. 
56. Id. at 121. 
57. Id. at 121–22.  
58. See id. at 123. 
59. NASAA Panel Ponders Bitcoin’s Promise and Pitfalls, 1448 Blue Sky 
L. Rep., Apr. 22, 2014, at ¶ 75,061 (noting that “most of the federal agencies 
have either ‘punted’ with respect to Bitcoin, or have taken somewhat 
inconsistent positions”). 
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creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitt-
ing” bitcoins and other virtual currencies.60 The BSA is primarily aimed 
at preventing money laundering and requires “financial institution[s] 
and banks to record and report information about . . . customer trans-
actions.”61 The FinCEN guidance noted that, while its regulations 
“define currency . . . as ‘the coin and paper money of the United States 
or of any other country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that 
[ii] circulates and [iii] is customarily used and accepted as a medium of 
exchange in the country of issuance,’” it considered any “medium of 
exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but does 
not have all the attributes of real currency” to be a “virtual currency,” 
and subject to regulation.62 Regardless, FinCEN also indicated that, 
“defining bitcoin was not pertinent because whether it’s a currency, 
commodity, or security, there are similar regulations in place across the 
industry.”63 
The FinCEN guidance divided those involved with Bitcoin and 
other virtual currencies into three categories: users, exchangers, and 
administrators.64 In regards to Bitcoin, a user is “[a] person that creates 
units . . . and uses [them] to purchase real or virtual goods and serv-
ices.”65 Users are not subject to regulation by FinCEN and do not have 
to register as a “Money Services Business” (MSB).66 In contrast, “a 
person that creates [bitcoins] and sells [them] to another person for real 
currency,” or “a person . . . [that] accepts [bitcoins] . . . from one per-
son and transmits [them] to another person as part of the acceptance 
and transfer of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for 
currency,” is an “exchanger,” subject to regulation, and must register 
as an MSB.67 An administrator is defined “as a person engaged as a  
60. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Dep’t of the Treas., FIN-2013-G001, 
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (Mar. 18, 2013) 
[hereinafter FinCEN], http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/ 
FIN-2013-G001.html [https://perma.cc/33WR-GS3L]; see also Ryan W. 
Neal, Bitcoin Competitors: What You Should Know About 6 Alternative 
Cryptocurrencies, Int’l Bus. Times (Jan. 14, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www. 
ibtimes.com/bitcoin-competitors-what-you-should-know-about-6-alternative-
cryptocurrencies-1540168 [https://perma.cc/3YSQ-6T84] (discussing other 
virtual currencies that are not as prominent or valuable as Bitcoin). 
61. Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering 
and Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 529, 537 (2014). 
62. FinCEN, supra note 60, at 1. 
63. Penrose, supra note 61, at 542. 
64. FinCEN, supra note 60, at 1. 
65. Id. at 5. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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business in issuing (putting into circulation) a virtual currency, and 
who has the authority to redeem (to withdraw from circulation) such 
virtual currency.”68 Administrators must register as MSBs.69 However, 
as Bitcoin does not have any central authority, the “Administrator” 
category does not apply.70 
For those that use bitcoins to buy goods or services, FinCEN’s 
guidance means very little; these people are only considered “users” and 
are not subject to any regulation.71 Also, for those involved in the Bit-
coin mining process, FinCEN’s guidance indicates that as long as the 
miner only uses the bitcoins for his/her own purposes, he/she should 
not qualify as an MSB.72 However, any Bitcoin business that seeks to 
facilitate the conversion of bitcoins into cash, like a wallet company or 
an exchange, does qualify as an “exchanger” and must register as an 
MSB.73 
B. IRS Treatment of Bitcoin 
In its March 2014 guidance, the IRS took a slightly different 
approach to Bitcoin’s categorization. The IRS stated that it considered 
bitcoins to be “property,” and would tax them like any other appreci-
able property.74 This means that when a taxpayer acquires a bitcoin, he 
takes initial basis in the individual coin, marking it at its current fair 
market value.75 A taxpayer may consult any online exchange that 
reports the price of bitcoins as a function of supply and demand to 
determine the “fair market value” of the bitcoin; the taxpayer must also 
consistently use the same online exchange when marking the fair market 
value of any other bitcoins he acquires.76 Mined bitcoins must also be 
valued at the time of receipt.77 When a taxpayer disposes of a bitcoin, 
he must recognize any gain that is greater than his initial basis.78 
 
68. Id. at 2. 
69. Penrose, supra note 61, at 539. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 540–41. 
73. Id. at 539. 
74. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 [hereinafter IRS]. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. at 938–39 (stating that the calculation of fair market value must 
be done “in a reasonable manner that is consistently applied”). 
77. Omri Marian, Marian: Bitcoin and Notice 2014-21, TaxProf Blog 
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/03/ma
rian-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/KV95-HSXA]. 
78. IRS, supra note 74, at 939. 
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Disposition of bitcoins also includes spending them to buy other prop-
erty, and taxpayers could incur gain by buying property with appreci-
ated bitcoins.79 
The IRS’s guidance also notes that bitcoins may be capital property 
in the hands of some Bitcoin users, and, if held for the necessary amount 
of time, may enjoy capital gains treatment.80 To qualify a bitcoin as a 
capital asset, the taxpayer would have to not be holding the bitcoin as 
“stock in trade,” or be a “dealer” of bitcoins.81 Any gain from a bitcoin 
transferred after being held for more than a year would be considered 
a capital gain.82 Conversely, if a taxpayer holds bitcoins as inventory in 
his business, the disposition of the bitcoins would be treated as ordinary 
gain or loss.83 
In regards to reporting, the IRS has applied the same requirements 
to Bitcoin transactions as to any other property exchanges.84 Any Bit-
coin payment of more than $600 must be reported to the IRS and the 
payee with a Form 1099.85 While in theory this reporting mechanism 
makes sense, its application may be troublesome. Because of the anony-
mity of Bitcoin transactions, it may be difficult for a taxpayer to know 
whom to send the 1099 to, and whom the taxpayer should list as the 
payee, when he reports the payment to the IRS.86 Clearer reporting 
mechanisms likely need to be developed in order to make taxing Bitcoin 
transactions a more straightforward proposition. 
C. SEC v. Shavers87 
In late 2013, the federal court had its first opportunity to examine 
the identity of Bitcoin.88 Trendon Shavers, a Texas resident, began ad-
vertising and soliciting contributions to a venture called Bitcoin Savings 
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80. IRS, supra note 74, at 939. 
81. I.R.C. § 1221(1) (2012). 
82. Id. § 1222(3). 
83. Marian, supra note 77. 
84. IRS, supra note 74, at 939. 
85. Id. 
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87.  No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
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and Trust (BTCST) in November 2011.89 Shavers promised his invest-
ors returns of 1% daily interest, and collected over 700,000 bitcoins from 
his investors, valued at more than 4.5 million dollars.90 
Once the SEC became aware of Shavers’ scheme (likely as a result 
of investors losing more than a third of their principal investment) it 
quickly asserted, that, “Shavers made a number of misrepresentations 
to investors . . . and . . . defrauded [them].”91 Shavers challenged the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction of the case, and whether his enter-
prise was a security subject to the SEC’s regulation.92 The Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas was then tasked with 
determining whether Shavers’ BTCST was a security within the 
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.93 
In order to determine whether BTCST was a security, the court 
examined whether BTCST was an “investment contract” under the 
Supreme Court’s famous Howey Test.94 In Howey, the Supreme Court 
held that “an investment contract . . . [is a] transaction or scheme 
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led 
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third 
party.”95 To apply this test, the district court determined that the 
contribution of bitcoins to a venture satisfied the “money” requirement 
of the Howey Test.96 The court stated, 
It is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money. It can be used to 
purchase goods or services, and as Shavers stated, used to pay for 
individual living expenses. . . . Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or 
form of money, and investors wishing to invest in BTCST 
provided an investment of money.97 
Once the court determined that Bitcoin fulfilled the money require-
ment, it found that Shavers’ BTCST satisfied the rest of the Howey 
Test, and that Shavers was selling securities.98 
 
89. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1. 
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While the district court called Bitcoin a “currency,” other regula-
tory agencies have declined to adhere to the same characterization.99 
After the decision, FinCEN, for instance, indicated that categorizing 
Bitcoin was “outside its purview.”100 The court’s decision in SEC v. 
Shavers has done little to settle Bitcoin’s categorization, and has caused 
some to question whether the court’s holding opens the door to bitcoins 
themselves being considered securities.101 
III. Bitcoin’s Identity Crisis 
A. Bitcoin Is Not a Currency 
Commentators often argue that Bitcoin is a currency and should be 
regulated as such.102 Propelling this argument is the similarity between 
bitcoins and cash—namely that both can be used to purchase goods 
and transferred to exchange value.103 While the functions of Bitcoin and 
traditional currency often overlap, it is inappropriate to treat Bitcoin 
as a currency because of the definition of currency.104 
In the Code of Federal Regulations, the United States Department 
of the Treasury defines currency as, “[t]he coin and paper money of the 
United States or of any other country that is designated as legal tender 
and that circulates and is customarily used and accepted as a medium 
of exchange in the country of issuance.”105 While this definition is very 
permissive in what could be considered a currency, the primary thrust 
of the definition requires that a government declare that a particular 
medium of exchange is its designated currency. Bitcoin cannot meet 
this definition, because no government has claimed Bitcoin as its official 
medium of exchange.106 
If the hurdle of government recognition could be overcome or 
ignored, Bitcoin would still struggle to fit the definition of currency. 
Some have suggested that Bitcoin cannot be a currency because of its 
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inherent instability.107 Because of the built-in limits on the number of 
bitcoins that can exist, the value of bitcoins will continue to fluctuate 
radically and trend towards deflation.108 This price instability will likely 
make it difficult for Bitcoin to ever become the “customarily used and 
accepted medium of exchange” of any country.109 
B. Bitcoin Cannot be a Security 
Others have suggested that Bitcoin is a security.110 The reason for 
this suggestion likely comes from popular discussions of buying bitcoins 
as investments and adding them to one’s portfolio.111 Also, treating 
Bitcoin as a security is tempting because of the United States’ robust 
securities regulations, which are designed to protect investors from 
fraud and give investors enough information to make informed invest-
ments.112 However, regulating Bitcoin under U.S. securities law would 
be inappropriate because Bitcoin does not share the essential attributes 
of a security.113 One of the defining hallmarks of a security is that the 
security represents a claim against an entity or issuer.114 As Bitcoin is 
not backed by anything, it is unclear what holding a bitcoin could give 
one a claim to.115 
The Securities Act offers a long list of financial instruments that 
are subject to U.S. securities regulations, including, “any note, 
stock, . . . bond, . . . [and] investment contract.”116 While many of the 
enumerated items are unique financial instruments, existing only in 
specific circumstances, the category of “investment contract” acts as a 
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broad catchall.117 If Bitcoin has any chance of being considered a 
security, it will be because it meets the requirements of an investment 
contract.118 
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,119 the Supreme Court first articulated 
the standard for what constitutes an investment contract.120 In this 
case, the Court sought to determine whether the sale of a portion of an 
orange grove, along with a service contract to maintain the grove, was 
an investment contract security.121 The Court held that an investment 
contract is “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] 
invests his money [2] in a common enterprise [3] and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”122 The 
Court determined that the sale of a piece of the orange grove was an 
investment contract, because the purchasers expected to make profits 
only as a result of the accompanying service contract tending the 
grove.123 
Bitcoin likely satisfies the first prong of the Howey investment test 
and meets the requirement for an investment of money because bitcoins 
have value. This is essentially the holding of the court in the Shavers 
case, where the judge noted that bitcoins acted as money because things 
could be bought with them.124 Furthermore, most Bitcoin users acquire 
their bitcoins by exchanging currency on an exchange, demonstrating a 
monetary investment.125 Even those that acquire their bitcoins through 
the mining process may be considered as having made a monetary in-
vestment in Bitcoin.126 The mining process requires the Bitcoin user to 
expend electricity and computing power to generate a bitcoin.127 Some 
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commentators have suggested that it costs roughly $2.50 worth of 
electricity and computing power to mine a single bitcoin.128 
While acquiring bitcoins is likely an investment of money, the 
Bitcoin system itself likely cannot meet the Howey Test’s second prong: 
the requirement of commonality.129 Courts analyze commonality under 
several different standards; however, the two main lines of analysis con-
sist of horizontal commonality and vertical commonality.130 Horizontal 
commonality examines the relationship between all investors in an 
enterprise and whether all the investors’ pooled funds are exposed to 
the same risks.131 In contrast, vertical commonality examines the rel-
ationship between investors and the promoter, and how closely the 
investors’ profits are tied to the promoter’s efforts.132 
The main difficulty in finding commonality within Bitcoin is deter-
mining what the “enterprise” itself is. Proponents of horizontal 
commonality have argued that, by buying a bitcoin, a person is taking 
a stake in how the Bitcoin system fares.133 Presumably, if Bitcoin as a 
whole becomes more desirable, each individual bitcoin becomes more 
valuable.134 However, people buy bitcoins for a host of different reasons; 
some look to hold them as investments, and others merely seek to use 
them as a way to buy things online without the hassle of traditional 
payment processors.135 While users in these different categories face 
some of the same risks, their risks are not identical. Bitcoin investors 
are likely far more concerned with the value of Bitcoin as a whole over 
the long term, while people only looking to use bitcoins to buy things 
are arguably more concerned with short term pricing, and whether the 
retailers they want to transact with will accept bitcoins. Buyers’ risks 
differing with their motivations is not an issue for traditional securities, 
because an expectation of profit is a prerequisite for an investment to 
be a security, under the Howey Test.136 
Likewise, in regards to vertical commonality, proponents have sugg-
ested that computer programmers and developers, working within the 
Bitcoin network, can be considered promoters of the enterprise, and 
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that investors’ returns are tied to these promoters’ efforts.137 While com-
puter developers and programmers that are working to create new 
applications to aid in the use of Bitcoin likely increase the worth of the 
Bitcoin network, it is not clear that these developers’ efforts are truly 
aimed at making bitcoins worth more. These developers work indepen-
dently of one another and seek to make a profit for themselves, not for 
general base of Bitcoin users.138 As many of these developers are com-
peting against each other, it would be difficult to substantiate that they 
are all working together toward a common end. 
In regards to the third prong of the Howey test, requiring that in-
vestors expect profits solely from the efforts of others, it is unclear 
whether Bitcoin satisfies this requirement.139 While people hold bitcoins 
for any number of reasons, the majority likely holds them with the 
expectation, or at least hope, that they will appreciate, because the 
limited number of merchants that accept bitcoins make them difficult 
to spend.140 Those holding bitcoins solely for transacting business, how-
ever, would not likely satisfy this prong, for the same reason that it is 
generally accepted that a person who holds dollars does not expect to 
make a profit from holding them.141 The investors that do hope to make 
a profit from their Bitcoin holdings may be reliant on the efforts of 
some third party to make the Bitcoin network more valuable.142 It is, 
however, still difficult to pinpoint exactly who these third parties are, 
and how their different development projects and uses for Bitcoin come 
together in a cohesive manner to improve Bitcoin holders as a whole. 
Other Bitcoin investors may argue that they expect to make a profit 
from their bitcoins because of their usefulness and inherent scarcity.143 
After running Bitcoin through the Howey Test, it is difficult to see 
how Bitcoin could be classified as an investment contract. Calling 
Bitcoin an “enterprise” would seem to imagine a far more cohesive pur-
pose behind Bitcoin than appears to exist. Bitcoin does not seem to 
readily fit into any category of security. 
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IV. Why Bitcoin is a Commodity 
A. Bitcoin is a Commodity Because of its Economic Function 
It would make sense for regulators to treat Bitcoin as a commodity. 
Commodities are generally defined as “goods sold in the market with a 
quality and value uniform throughout the world.”144 This categorization 
would be appropriate because it realistically reflects the economic 
behavior of Bitcoin users and squares with traditional economic concep-
tions of exchange. 
Bitcoin should primarily be considered a commodity because it 
serves the function of money in its community of users. Users exchange 
bitcoins to obtain property that they desire. In his seminal work, Man, 
Economy, and State, Murray Rothbard argues that all monetary 
exchanges are actually indirect commodity exchanges.145 Rothbard 
supports his proposition by tracing the development of money and ex-
change. Before the widespread adoption of a common form of money, 
people had to engage in bartering, or “direct exchange,” in order to 
complete transactions.146 In the barter system, if a wheat farmer needed 
to hire a teacher for his children, he had to find a teacher that was 
willing to teach his children in exchange for some amount of his wheat. 
This system was time-consuming and inefficient, and it limited people’s 
choice of transacting partners to only those that desired the kind of 
property they had to trade.147 
Money is created when a community of people agrees upon a 
common commodity that can be converted and exchanged between 
them.148 The hallmarks of early forms of the money commodity were 
that it could be easily transported, divided, and valued in different 
places.149 For this reason, precious metal commodities gained the status 
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of money in many societies.150 For instance, gold is relatively easy to 
transport, can be broken down into smaller pieces, and is desirable for 
use as ornamentation in many different places.151 The more people that 
desire to possess a commodity, the better form of money it makes.152 
When a commodity comes into “general use as a medium of exchange,” 
it is defined as money.153 And, when a government adopts that form of 
money as the preferred medium for the country, it becomes currency.154 
The money commodity has further evolved because of the difficulty 
and costs of transporting and dividing the chosen commodity.155 This 
evolution occurred when people decided that instead of exchanging a 
common money commodity, they would instead exchange receipts and 
claims on the money commodity held in a central location.156 As a result 
of this community agreement, paper claims quickly assumed the role of 
money because they were easier to transport and divide. 
The adoption of paper money introduced a new problem into the 
exchange system—trust.157 When dealing with people from different 
communities, how could a seller be sure that a buyer’s paper claim to 
the money commodity was actually backed by the money commodity? 
To combat this problem, trusted intermediaries and governments 
assumed the role of managing the central depository of the money 
commodity.158 People in far reaching communities could trust and 
accept the paper claims that outsiders sought to exchange with them 
because they felt confident that the third party issuing the paper claim 
was trustworthy, and would honor the claim, if they decided to ex-
change the receipt for the money commodity.159 
In the modern era, money has undergone another evolution. When 
governments and other trusted intermediaries found that it was too 
difficult to maintain a common pool of money commodity to back each 
claim and receipt, they shifted the backing from the money commodity 
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to their own authority. Now, instead of exchanges taking place through 
claims on the money commodity, exchanges occur through claims on 
the government issuing the money.160 The issuing government then 
lends its authority, and, ultimately, army, to secure the exchange.161 
People can be confident that they could later exchange the government-
backed money with others because the government guaranteed that it 
would be accepted.162 
Bitcoin seeks to operate in the same way. However, instead of act-
ing as a claim on some money commodity, Bitcoin purports to be the 
money commodity itself. By holding itself out as an accepted medium 
of exchange within a community, Bitcoin acts as the money commodity. 
Bitcoin, further, meets the characteristics that Rothbard identified as 
being desirable in a money commodity. Bitcoins are very easy to 
transmit across the internet, are divisible to eight decimal places, and 
are recognized as valuable across a widespread community of users.163 
Furthermore, while Bitcoin acts as a money commodity in its 
community of users, from a pricing standpoint, it is valued like other 
commodities.164 The price of traditional commodities, like gold, silver, 
and agricultural products, vary in accordance with their demand and 
scarcity.165 When more people want a commodity that has a fixed 
supply, the price rises. 
Similarly, the price of Bitcoin fluctuates according to the same fixed 
supply model.166 Bitcoins are scarce because the algorithm controlling 
how many bitcoins are released into the market through mining rewards 
is designed to taper the supply of bitcoins, until no more are created.167 
Bitcoins are considered rare because there is a fixed supply of them, 
leading users to be willing to pay increasing prices to control them. The 
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value of a bitcoin is ultimately driven by supply and demand—a coin 
is worth whatever someone is willing to pay for it.168 
Some have argued that it is inappropriate to consider Bitcoin as a 
commodity, because it does not have an inherent use value, which is 
sometimes considered a necessary quality of a commodity.169 Unlike 
grain, or frozen orange juice concentrate, bitcoins cannot be used in the 
same way that other commodities can. While, on its face, this argument 
appears to be fatal for Bitcoin’s classification as a commodity, it con-
strues the concept of inherent value too narrowly. Bitcoin’s inherent 
value is found in its ability to decrease the transaction costs of exchang-
ing property online.170 Before Bitcoin, the only real way to exchange 
value online was through the use of a trusted intermediary, like a bank 
or PayPal.171 These third parties were necessary to track transactions 
and ensure that transferred property actually existed. For their services, 
these third parties charge a flat fee, or take a percentage of the trans-
action.172 With the advent of Bitcoin, however, third parties are no 
longer necessary to conduct trusted transactions online; the block-chain 
acts to ensure that each bitcoin exists, and can only be held by one 
person at a time.173 This means that the inherent value of a bitcoin is 
found in the difference of transaction costs between an online three-
party exchange, and a two-party exchange.174 
Furthermore, Rothbard argued that, when talking about money, 
use value should be irrelevant. Rothbard writes: “The sole use of money 
is to be exchanged for goods, and if it had no price and therefore no 
exchange-value, it could not be exchanged and would no longer be 
used.”175 
B. Bitcoin Fits Within the CEA’s Definition of a Commodity 
Not only does Bitcoin effectively serve the purpose of a money 
commodity from a traditional economic viewpoint, Bitcoin also fits 
within the legal conception of a commodity. The Commodity Exchange 
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Act (CEA)176 regulates a broad array of commodities, and likely can 
accommodate Bitcoin. The Act states, 
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, 
barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, 
Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and 
oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, 
and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, 
soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen 
concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles, except 
onions (as provided by section 13-1 of this title) and motion 
picture box office receipts (or any index, measure, value, or data 
related to such receipts), and all services, rights, and interests 
(except motion picture box office receipts, or any index, measure, 
value or data related to such receipts) in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.177 
It is clear that the CEA was intended to capture the agricultural 
products typically thought of as “commodities,” but the Act’s broad 
language also encompasses “all other goods and articles, . . . in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”178 
The primary question in determining whether a good or article is a 
commodity under the CEA is whether the item is one “in which con-
tracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt with.”179 
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has defined a 
futures contract as “an agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for 
delivery in the future in which the price is determined at the outset of 
the agreement.”180 Only certain commodities, however, are adaptable to 
organized futures trading.181 In order to be traded on a futures exchange, 
a commodity must: 1) be homogenous; 2) be susceptible to standardized 
grading; 3) have large supply and demand; 4) have an unrestricted 
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market; 5) have uncertain supply and demand; and 6) not be perish-
able.182 So, while grain, cotton, and tin are strong candidates for futures 
trading, uncanned fruit, tea, and shoes are not adaptable to futures 
trading because they do not possess all of these characteristics.183 These 
characteristics ensure that a commodity’s risks are sufficient for spec-
ulators to demand a futures market.184 
Bitcoin possesses all the characteristics that are needed for a comm-
odity to be traded on a futures exchange. Bitcoins are homogenous, 
imperishable, and susceptible to standardized grading, as all bitcoins 
are the same, and their quality does not vary.185 Further, a large supply 
of bitcoins exists, and demand for them fluctuates in an uncertain 
manner.186 And the Bitcoin market is unrestricted, as no single entity 
controls the supply or demand of bitcoins.187 There is nothing that 
conceptually prevents bitcoins from being traded on a futures contract. 
Two parties could easily contract for the sale of some amount of bitcoins 
at a present price, with the actual exchange of the bitcoins happening 
in the future. Furthermore, the risks of Bitcoin are such that futures 
trading would be beneficial to Bitcoin users; futures contracts would be 
of great use for companies being paid in bitcoins to protect against 
bitcoin price drops.188 
While bitcoins likely fall under the CEA’s definition of commodity, 
it is not clear what category of commodity they fit into.189 The CEA 
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Wash. Post (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
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breaks commodities down into three categories: agricultural commod-
ities, excluded commodities, and exempt commodities.190 While agricul-
tural commodities are self-explanatory, the other two categories bear 
explanation. Excluded commodities are made up of interest rates, curr-
encies, and other financial instruments, whereas exempt commodities 
function as a “catch-all category” that includes energy interests and 
precious metals.191 
Bitcoin likely fits best in the category of exempt commodities.192 
This categorization would make sense primarily because of the similar-
ities between bitcoins and precious metals: each exists in a limited 
supply, is capable of physical delivery, and is a capital good.193 Further, 
the CFTC has classified intangible commodities as exempt commodities 
“if ownership of the commodity can be conveyed in some manner and 
the commodity can be consumed.”194 Bitcoins can arguably be consum-
ed, in the sense that they can be spent or traded.195 Finally, classifying 
Bitcoin as an “exempt commodity” would be consistent with the IRS’s 
and FinCEN’s guidance, as neither treats Bitcoin strictly as a currency 
or financial instrument.196 
V. Advantages to Treating Bitcoin as a Commodity 
A. CEA and CFTC Regulation 
If Bitcoin is classified as a commodity, the CEA could regulate 
Bitcoin exchanges, and the CFTC could oversee any Bitcoin derivatives 
that may be developed. Organized and regulated commodity exchanges 
promote price stabilization in the market, and allow investors to engage 
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in “hedging” to limit the risk of their investments.197 This kind of regul-
ation would be very beneficial to Bitcoin users, because it would create 
increased confidence in the Bitcoin economy and ecosystem.198 
The CEA contains a list of “core principles,” to which all commod-
ities “boards of trade” must adhere.199 J.M. Mehl, the first administrator 
of the Commodity Exchange Authority, explained that the purpose of 
the CEA was to “assure the reflection of true prices” and “to prevent 
cheating and fraud, [and] to compel honest accounting to custom-
ers . . . .”200 To achieve these goals, any U.S.-based commodity exchan-
ge must be registered and adhere to the guidelines of the CEA.201 The 
CEA requires that registered exchanges establish clear rules for traders, 
keep detailed trading records, and make regular reports.202 Further, the 
CEA contains broad provisions to prevent fraud, and requires exchange 
operators to prevent price manipulation through enforcing position 
limits.203 
The CEA’s regulations would be very beneficial to the Bitcoin net-
work and users. While CEA compliance would likely change some 
aspects of Bitcoin transactions, particularly the anonymity of trans-
actions because of the CEA’s reporting requirements, the increased 
confidence that users could have in Bitcoin exchanges would likely be 
worth the sacrifice.204 The current exchanges on which Bitcoins are 
traded leave much to be desired, particularly the services that seek to 
offer derivatives trading. For instance, one service, BTCOracle, offers 
“binary options” to users.205 The site terms its financial instruments in 
those of a game, with the page titled “How to Play” explaining how 
options trading works.206 In order to trade options on this site, “players”  
197. Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 Yale 
L.J. 822, 823–30 (1951). 
198. See Micheal A. Fixler, Note, Cyberfinance: Regulating Banking on the 
Internet, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 81, 108 (1996). 
199. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2014). 
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19 J. Farm Econ. 313, 315 (1937). 
201. See Baer & Saxon, supra note 181, at 252. 
202. Id. at 252–54. 
203. Comment, supra note 197, at 837–39. See also Shadab, supra note 180, at 4–
5 (“[The CEA] require[s] exchanges to establish and enforce rules to protect 
customers, prevent fraud and manipulation, maintain and disclose records, 
and maintain fair and orderly markets by . . . enforcing position limits.”). 
204. See Baer & Saxon, supra note 181, at 253 (noting that registered exchanges 
must keep a record of “the parties to all transactions”). 
205. How to Play, BTCOracle, http://btcoracle.com/howto.php [https://perma. 
cc/JK9H-25T4] (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
206. Id. 
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send bitcoins to the hosts’ Bitcoin account, and if their option “wins” 
the hosts send the winnings back.207 This entire process happens 
anonymously, and the only assurance that users have that they will 
receive their “winnings” is the faith they have in the site’s operators.208 
Were Bitcoin to be regulated by the CFTC, sites acting as 
exchanges and offering options trading would be subject to the 
reporting and enforcement requirements of the CEA, allowing con-
sumers to be confident that the prices they are seeing are an accurate 
reflection of the Bitcoin market.209 Also, consumers would be able to do 
more than just “believe” that the people they are transacting with will 
hold up their end of the bargain.210 As the Bitcoin system currently 
stands, basic contracting principles do not afford Bitcoin users enough 
protection. The anonymity of the current system leaves consumers with 
little protection or legal recourse.211 
B. Treating Bitcoin as a Commodity Would Result in More Efficient 
Tax Treatment 
One of the primary tax advantages of treating Bitcoin as a comm-
odity would be the ability for Bitcoin dealers and traders to elect mark-
to-market accounting. Section 475(e) of the Internal Revenue Code 
allows commodities dealers and traders to recognize gain or loss on any 
commodities that they hold at the end of the taxable year.212 The 
taxpayer is then allowed to treat these gains or losses as ordinary gains 
or losses, rather than capital ones.213 The Internal Revenue Code defines 
a dealer as anyone that purchases commodities from, or sells commod-
ities to, customers in the regular course of business.214 In contrast, 
traders are individuals that make it their business to frequently buy 
and sell commodities, making a profit off of the daily fluctuations of the 
market.215 
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While only a portion of Bitcoin’s users would likely be able to take 
advantage of the mark-to-market provisions, the accounting procedure 
could be an important piece in the development of a more robust 
Bitcoin market and exchange. The chief advantage of mark-to-market 
accounting is that losses, which would normally be treated as short-
term capital losses subject to a $3,000 current deduction limit, are con-
verted to ordinary losses that may be entirely deducted in the current 
year.216 As Bitcoin has a history of rapid price fluctuation, the option 
to fully recognize losses sooner would be beneficial to those regularly 
buying and selling bitcoins.217 The option to use this accounting method 
would give developers a new tax incentive to develop Bitcoin programs 
and services to make the Bitcoin economy function more efficiently.218 
Additionally, regulating Bitcoin as a commodity under the CEA 
would provide a clearer tax reporting mechanism. As the IRS’s guidance 
currently stands, Bitcoin users are required to report bitcoin transact-
ions to their transacting partners on a Form 1099.219 This can be prob-
lematic, as Bitcoin users rarely know with whom they are transacting.220 
Under the CEA, however, registered Bitcoin exchanges, and wallet com-
panies, would be required to track all transactions, including Bitcoin 
users’ identities.221 This would greatly simplify Bitcoin users’ ability to 
comply with the IRS’s guidance. 
VI. Bitcoin Consumer Protection Regulation 
A. Why and Where Bitcoin Consumer Protection Regulation Is Needed 
In addition to the market and tax advantages that regulating Bit-
coin as a commodity would bring, the CEA could also provide import-
ant consumer protections to Bitcoin users. Currently, Bitcoin users 
have very little protection, and losses from theft and fraud have become 
increasingly frequent.222 Further, the Bitcoin network operates in a 
highly technical system, and many Bitcoin users are at a severe inform-
ation disadvantage when compared to those that operate the system. If 
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the Bitcoin economy is going to grow and develop successfully, consum-
ers need to have confidence that their bitcoins are securely held; regulat-
ion can provide some of this confidence.223 
While consumer protection regulation is clearly needed in the 
Bitcoin economy, a difficult question of where to regulate arises. As the 
Bitcoin network is really nothing more than a collection of individual 
computers working together, there is no proper central Bitcoin author-
ity or organizing body on which to impose regulations.224 As a result, 
Bitcoin regulators should look to the myriad secondary businesses and 
exchanges that are sprouting up to make Bitcoin more accessible to 
consumers.225 By regulating at the point of the exchanges and wallet 
services, regulators can ensure that developers have proper incentives 
to play by the rules. For this reason, CEA regulation would be approp-
riate, as the regulatory focus is on the market makers, rather than mere 
market participants.226 
B. Regulatory Need 1: Impose Reserve Requirements  
on Bitcoin Exchanges 
One important, and currently absent, regulation that regulators 
should consider for Bitcoin exchanges are reserve requirements.227 Under 
the current model, when a Bitcoin exchange or wallet service loses 
bitcoins, or is robbed, the exchange simply covers its losses by making 
deductions from users’ accounts.228 This kind of behavior erodes con-
sumer confidence and makes consumers bear the risk that their chosen 
service’s security system will be breached. 229 Most consumers are ill 
equipped to evaluate the quality of security that different wallet comp-
anies, or exchanges, provide because of the high degree of complexity 
of cyber-security, and the inaccessibility of most of the important infor-
mation.230 By imposing a reserve requirement on Bitcoin exchanges, 
regulators could help ensure liquidity in the Bitcoin market and incent-
ivize exchanges and wallet services to properly safeguard users’ 
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bitcoins.231 Reserve requirements could be achieved under the CEA 
through their inclusion in the by-laws that the CEA requires all regist-
ered exchanges to establish.232 
Some commentators have suggested that the benefits of imposed 
reserve requirements could be achieved through participation in an 
insurance program.233 Deposit insurance would increase consumers’ 
confidence in the Bitcoin network and allay their fears of having their 
bitcoins stolen.234 Furthermore, by requiring that all Bitcoin exchanges 
and services carry some sort of insurance, consumers would have an-
other point of comparison to examine when choosing which service best 
meets their needs and desired amount of risk.235 
C. Regulatory Need 2: Ensure that Bitcoin Users Understand  
the Risks of the System 
By imposing registration requirements on Bitcoin exchanges, 
regulators can also seek to ensure that consumers are properly informed 
of the inherent risks that exist within Bitcoin. For instance, consumers 
should be warned of the fact that there is no way to reverse a Bitcoin 
transaction, and that there are no chargebacks.236 Additionally, con-
sumers should be reminded of the importance of keeping their “private 
keys private,” because if someone were to gain access to it, that person 
would control all of the consumer’s bitcoins.237 By ensuring that con-
sumers are made aware of the details of the Bitcoin network, regulators 
can better protect the public from fraud and theft. 
Conclusion 
Bitcoin, while an exciting technology, needs clearer regulatory 
classification and treatment to allow the development of the Bitcoin 
economy to continue. Because Bitcoin acts as a kind of money between 
its users, it should be considered a commodity. Treating Bitcoin in this 
way would be consistent with the historical conception of what money 
is and would accurately reflect fluctuations and volatilities in the Bit-
coin economy. Further, by treating Bitcoin as a commodity, it could be 
regulated under the CEA, and any derivatives could be handled by the 
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CFTC. As these regulatory frameworks already exist, Bitcoin develop-
ers could draw from existing knowledge when looking to expand the 
Bitcoin economy. Finally, as the Bitcoin economy grows, regulators 
should pay special attention to the implementation of consumer protec-
tion regulation. Only once consumer confidence in Bitcoin has increased 
will Bitcoin be able to achieve its full potential. 
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